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THE DELEGATION LOTTERY 
Adrian Vermeule* 
Replying to Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated 
Power: Uncertainty, Risk, and the Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 1035 (2006). 
 
Professor Matthew Stephenson’s article on legislative allocation of 
delegated power between agencies and courts is clear, rigorous, and 
brief, and makes a tangible contribution.  The paper models “the deci-
sion calculus faced by a rational, risk-averse legislator who must 
choose between delegation to an agency and delegation to a court.”1  
On the assumption that delegation to agencies tends to produce consis-
tency across issues while delegation to courts tends to produce consis-
tency over time, a risk-averse legislator interested in reducing variance 
along either dimension will face a tradeoff between intertemporal risk 
diversification and interissue risk diversification.  From this basic 
tradeoff, Stephenson derives comparative statics about the rational, 
risk-averse legislator’s choice of delegates under various conditions. 
Stephenson himself describes the article’s contribution as “incre-
mental,”2 and this seems appropriate.  In general, there are two (com-
patible) ways of evaluating positive models: by reference to the realism 
of the model’s assumptions and by reference to the model’s ability to 
generate testable predictions that yield results with real-world signifi-
cance.3  I shall suggest that the limitations of Stephenson’s legislative-
delegation model stem from excessively artificial assumptions and 
from an inability to yield significant predictions — in either the politi-
cal or statistical sense. 
With respect to assumptions, the tradeoff between realism and 
mathematical tractability means that necessary simplifications are part 
and parcel of the enterprise; but a good model is one that carves the 
subject at its joints, capturing the central dynamic of the motivating 
examples.  In the legislative-delegation model Stephenson offers, how-
ever, the crucial simplifications seem not only artificial, but arbitrary 
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 * Bernard D. Meltzer Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.  Thanks to Jack Gold-
smith, Daryl Levinson, Matt Stephenson, and Cass Sunstein for helpful comments. 
 1 Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty, Risk, and 
the Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1035 (2006). 
 2 Id. at 1042. 
 3 Compare Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in THE PHILOSOPHY 
OF ECONOMICS: AN ANTHOLOGY 180 (Daniel M. Hausman ed., 2d ed. 1994), with Daniel M. 
Hausman, Why Look Under the Hood?, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS, supra, at 217. 
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— as though a political scientist decided to study only the behavior of 
left-handed senators, deferring right-handed ones to future research.  
In particular, it is unsatisfying to model legislators as entering a “policy 
lottery” by enacting ambiguous delegating statutes, but then also to 
picture them as clearly specifying the identity of the delegate.  The 
same institutional and political factors that tend to produce a first-
order policy lottery over statutory substance also tend to produce a 
second-order “delegation lottery” over the question whether agencies or 
courts have ultimate interpretive authority. 
With respect to predictions, the model implies comparative statics 
that yield various hypotheses, but it seems unlikely that these hypothe-
ses, even if testable, are significant in a political sense.  The factors the 
model includes are, at best, second-decimal considerations relative to 
the factors it excludes.  Indeed, if the included factors really are sec-
ond-decimal considerations for rational legislators, the model may not 
be testable in any event: the included factors might not be sufficiently 
weighty to leave statistically significant traces that are discernable 
through the fog of political behavior. 
I.  THE DELEGATION LOTTERY 
The most crucial of the model’s assumptions is a sharp distinction 
between the questions “delegation of what?” and “delegation to 
whom?”  The rational legislator is pictured as voting on a statute with 
ambiguous first-order provisions and yet as also making a definite sec-
ond-order choice about whether courts or agencies will have the au-
thority to interpret those provisions.4  The motivation for this partial 
simplification is clear.  On the one hand, absent first-order ambiguity 
there would be no interpretive questions in the picture.  On the other 
hand, introducing second-order ambiguity about the identity of the 
delegate would make the problem substantially less tractable.  Yet the 
resulting simplification is excessively artificial.  It does not resonate 
with the realities of the administrative state, at least in modern times; 
it carves the subject against the grain. 
A danger signal here is the article’s relentless abstraction.  Stephen-
son is interested in generating models rather than empirical testing, 
but the article contains no real set of examples to motivate the model’s 
assumptions.  The debates over the Interstate Commerce Commission 
from the late nineteenth century are mentioned, as are a handful of 
statutes that explicitly assign interpretive responsibility to courts 
rather than agencies.5  Yet in the modern administrative state, many 
statutes are silent or ambiguous not only about various first-order legal 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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 5 See id. at 1039 & n.11. 
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and regulatory questions, but also about the identity of the delegate 
who is given interpretive authority.  The model’s partial simplification 
invokes the standard political science metaphor that legislators enact-
ing statutes with ambiguous first-order provisions enter a policy lot-
tery.  Yet if there is a first-order policy lottery about how statutes will 
be interpreted, there is also a second-order “delegation lottery” about 
who will ultimately do the interpreting. 
This second-order uncertainty6 should not be surprising; all of the 
institutional causes of first-order ambiguity can also cause second-
order ambiguity.  Failures of legislative foresight or simply poor draft-
ing may cause not only unintended first-order ambiguities, but also 
second-order ambiguities.  The inability of political coalitions to agree 
may produce legislation that is vague or ambiguous about substance, 
yet it may also produce legislation that is vague about the identity of 
the delegate.  Both sides of a contested policy question may prove will-
ing to take their chances at the second level as well as the first. 
Most fundamentally, the second-order delegation lottery arises from 
pervasive uncertainty in administrative law about the default rules for 
allocating interpretive authority.  At least for statutes enacted after 
1946, it might be tempting to say that the global second-order default 
rule is delegation to the judiciary, pointing to the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act’s provision that courts shall decide all relevant questions of 
law.7  Yet for decades after the Act’s passage, courts issued conflicting 
decisions about deference to administrative agencies and discussed a 
variety of relevant factors without a clear theoretical framework, thus 
creating substantial uncertainty about who the ultimate recipient of in-
terpretive authority would be when statutes were silent or ambiguous.8  
In the period after 1984, the Chevron decision9 established something 
like a global default rule for second-order allocation of interpretive au-
thority: if statutes were “clear,” courts would announce their meaning; 
if not, interpretations by the administering agencies would prevail so 
long as they were “reasonable.”  Yet even this default rule contained a 
great deal of lurking legal uncertainty because what is “clear” and 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 6 Following Stephenson, I use “uncertainty” in its colloquial sense, not in its technical sense of 
uncertainty as opposed to risk.  On this distinction, see DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD RAIFFA, 
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 7 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§§ 706 (2000). 
 8 For a summary of the conflicting approaches and the uncertainty they created, see Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 725 F.2d 761, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1984).  I bracket here the 
provocative claim that, for some time after 1946, there was a well-understood historical conven-
tion, since vanished from view, that a grant of rulemaking authority to an agency carried with it 
law-interpreting authority.  See Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with 
the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467 (2002). 
 9 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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what is “reasonable” is hardly self-evident, because Chevron deference 
only applied to agency interpretations that were sufficiently “authorita-
tive,”10 and because with respect to some ill-defined category of ques-
tions — for example, whether statutes create private causes of action 
— courts might say that the administering agency for Chevron pur-
poses just is the judiciary itself.11 
The uncertainties surrounding the delegation lottery have only in-
creased in recent years, since the all-important Mead decision.12  Since 
Mead, a large and growing body of law and theory —  “Chevron Step 
Zero”13 — addresses the question whether Congress will be taken to 
have delegated ultimate law-interpreting authority to agencies or 
courts.  The law of Chevron Step Zero is notably uncertain, in part be-
cause the Court majority that produced Mead refuses to bind itself to 
anything like categorical rules or conventions; the resulting doctrinal 
mess has produced serious confusion in the lower courts.14  Justice 
Breyer, who has some claim to being Mead’s intellectual mastermind 
(although not the decision’s actual author),15 recently opined that even 
notice-and-comment rulemaking, the staple diet of the administrative 
state, is neither necessary nor sufficient for Chevron deference.16  If 
this view prevails, it would produce a multifactor quicksand that 
courts and parties will have to traverse even to approach the Chevron 
inquiry — in turn creating pressure to avoid the whole Step Zero in-
quiry by claiming that statutes are “clear” in one direction or another, 
even if they really are not. 
Perhaps the model might be modified and extended to account for 
the delegation lottery.  Perhaps, without too great an increase in 
mathematical complexity, the model might incorporate the idea that 
the identity of the delegate is probabilistic, with legislators facing a 
cost to increase the probability of ending up with a delegate matching 
their preferences.  Another tradeoff inherent in modeling would then 
have increased bite, however: the more dimensions in which relevant 
actors may maneuver and the more types of transaction cost that are 
relevant to their behavior, the less likely it is that the model will yield 
specific and testable predictions — especially if the behavioral factors 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 10 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 11 See Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990).  
 12 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 13 See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 836 
(2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming Apr. 2006), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=739129. 
 14 See Adrian Vermeule, Introduction: Mead in the Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347 
(2003). 
 15 See Sunstein, supra note 13 (manuscript at 18). 
 16 See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2712–13 
(2005) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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one is attempting to predict are of small importance relative to other 
determinants of behavior.  I return to these points shortly.  All I mean 
to indicate here is that there is a tradeoff across the problems of (1) 
omitted considerations, (2) mathematical tractability, and (3) predictive 
determinacy.  The constraint on revising the model to sidestep problem 
(1) is that one or both of problems (2) and (3) is bound to become more 
serious. 
Stephenson concludes that “[l]egislators who delegate interpretive 
power must pick the agent to whom they will delegate, thereby choos-
ing which policy lottery they will enter.”17  The “must” here seems un-
grounded: legislators are never forced to specify a delegate, and much 
of the time they do not do so, at least not explicitly.  To be sure, the 
delegation lottery is sometimes avoided; criminal statutes are generally 
interpreted by the courts,18 and sometimes civil statutes are explicit 
about the choice of delegate, either by virtue of their text or by virtue 
of clear interpretive conventions in the background.  The point is not 
that legislators always enter a delegation lottery, but that they often 
do.  For a generation, at least, second-order uncertainty about statutes 
that do not speak explicitly to the identity of the delegate has been 
among the central issues of administrative law.  A model that puts the 
issue aside, whether for future research or not, is bound to seem and 
be artificial, even accounting for the necessary simplifications of posi-
tive political theory. 
II.  SECOND-DECIMAL CONSIDERATIONS AND 
TESTABLE PREDICTIONS 
Stephenson says, quite rightly, that the literature on delegation em-
phasizes three types of explanation — expertise, principal-agent rela-
tions, and the manipulation of political credit or blame — and that his 
model will add or expand upon19 a fourth factor: the relative variance 
associated with agency decisions and court decisions, both across issues 
and over time.  In this picture, rational legislators have an interest in 
consistency — in the reduction of variance — for its own sake, over 
and above their interest in the substance of the relevant rules.  Ste-
phenson points out that consistency can be defined either across issues 
or over time and that there is a tradeoff between the two.  Stephenson 
then suggests (and I will assume for discussion’s sake) that agencies 
are better at producing interissue consistency, while courts are better at 
producing intertemporal consistency.  To the extent that the preference 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 17 Stephenson, supra note 1, at 1070. 
 18 See Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990). 
 19 Stephenson builds upon models pioneered by Morris Fiorina.  See Stephenson, supra note 1, 
at 1045–47. 
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for interissue consistency predominates, legislators will favor delega-
tion to agencies; to the extent that consistency over time is more im-
portant, they will favor delegation to courts.  Putting aside additional 
complexities, this is the nub of the model. 
So the interest in variance reduction has marginal importance only 
to the extent rational legislators care about more than the expected 
value of the choice of delegate.  It exists, in other words, only once we 
have already bracketed and put aside the other considerations bearing 
upon the choice of delegate that Stephenson mentions — which dele-
gate is more likely to get policies right (the expertise interest), which 
delegate is more likely to give legislators the policies they want regard-
less of what is right (the interest in minimizing agency slack), and 
which delegation is more likely to generate political credit for legisla-
tors.  Let us stipulate that some variance-reduction interest exists, over 
and above these factors.  The crucial issue — one that the model can-
not tell us anything about — is the importance of this interest.  The 
danger is that we are dealing here with a second-decimal considera-
tion, one whose importance is swamped by the more familiar factors 
the model leaves aside. 
The principal-agent model of the choice of delegate, for example, 
resonates with what we observe of the administrative state independ-
ently and pre-theoretically.  It is obvious in many cases that legislators 
care very much about ensuring a delegate who will produce policies 
that suit their interests, in the expected-value sense, without particular 
regard to consistency either across issues or over time.  Perhaps in 
other cases the variance-reduction model gains traction, but it seems 
plausible that the obvious considerations bracketed by the model are 
also the most important considerations.  The factors emphasized in 
Stephenson’s model are not obvious, but by the same token they are 
not obviously important.  Counterintuitive models often lie about wait-
ing to be discovered just because the most intuitive considerations are, 
quite often, also the dominant considerations. 
Put another way, the model’s engine is an explicit assumption that 
legislators are risk averse.20  This is quite possible, and doubtless 
sometimes true; but how often is it true?  Here again the lack of con-
crete motivating examples makes it hard to come to grips with the is-
sue.  At one point Stephenson suggests that legislative risk aversion is 
a product of tight principal-agent control of legislators by corporate or 
economic interest groups, who themselves desire to reduce variance.21  
Yet the standard assumption in economic modeling is that corporations 
are risk neutral, because shareholders can diversify risk at lower cost 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 20 Id. at 1052. 
 21 Or so I read the discussion of “consistency interests.”  See id. at 1058–59.  
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than corporate managers.  Moreover, it is puzzling that legislators who 
are assumed to be risk averse are also assumed, by another crucial 
premise of the model, to be willing to enter a policy lottery in the first 
place; those who enter lotteries are usually risk-preferring. 
To be sure, the best way to determine whether variance reduction 
is a major or minor consideration is to test the model rather than rea-
son a priori or discuss case studies.  Yet the real possibility that vari-
ance reduction is a second-decimal consideration also undermines the 
model’s ability to generate testable predictions.  Here we must disen-
tangle two points.  Statistical significance is not the same as political or 
economic significance.  So one point is that the variance-reduction in-
terest might be detected by statistically significant tests, yet turn out 
not to matter very much.  It is also possible, however, that the very 
lack of political significance will make it hard to detect any variance-
reduction interest through the surrounding noise of legislative behav-
ior, just as a very small organism is undetectable with a crude micro-
scope.  Stephenson is admirably candid about this.  He calls his hy-
potheses testable “in principle,”22 but of course nearly all nonanalytic 
propositions are testable in principle.  The hard part is testing in prac-
tice, and it is not clear at all that this model yields practically testable 
predictions. 
CONCLUSION 
The variance-reduction model of legislative delegation is ingenious.  
It is not clear, however, what it is a model of.  Not of the modern ad-
ministrative state, in which the second-order delegation lottery over 
the identity of the interpreter is as important as the first-order policy 
lottery over the interpretation of ambiguous statutory provisions.  Not, 
or probably not, of legislators who are portrayed as beholden to risk- 
neutral interest groups and who plausibly care most of all about the 
standard considerations of expertise, slack minimization, and political 
credit that Stephenson puts aside.  Overall, one senses here that the 
model is dictating the choice of problems, rather than the problem 
suggesting the choice among models. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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